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A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
PROTECTING INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
ACROSS THE PRIVATE SECTOR
Joshua D. Blackmant
I. INTRODUCTION
Information technology is providing businesses with powerful
new marketing tools. Before the computer revolution, direct mar-
keters flooded mailboxes with junk mail for relatively few sales.
Now software can pinpoint target groups by comparing mailing lists
or by using "point-of-sale" 1 information to identify consumers
likely to buy certain products.2 Similarly, records kept in the com-
puter memory of TRW, Trans Union Corporation and Equifax,
Inc. gather the financial minutiae of most (more than 170 million)
American adults.3 From this financial data, mailing lists based on
an infinite variety of criteria are created and sold. While consumers
have legislative permission to obtain copies of their credit reports
Copyright 0 1993 by Joshua D. Blackman.
t Director, Legal Research Group, Find SVP. New York City; attorney admitted in
New York and Connecticut; author of The Legal Researcher's Internet Directory; email ad-
dress joshb@panix.com.
1. The Chief Executive Officer of Citicorp's Point-of-Sale (POS) Information Services,
Jerry Saltzgaber, described the features of a POS system:
When they join, consumers receive a personalized card with either a mag stripe
or a UPC bar code. Then by presenting these cards at the checkout counter
consumers automatically get credit for all the store coupons in effect at that
time and all purchases are recorded by household.
[The database is used] for a wide variety of direct marketing applications,
including delivering bar soap samples to competitive brand users, sending dis-
posable diaper coupons and baby food coupons to households with infant chil-
dren - inferred from prior purchases - and targeting the best prospects' for
magazine subscription acquisition programs.
Data Protection, Computers, and Changing Information Practices, Hearings on H.R. 685
Before the Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House
Committee on Government Operations, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 86 (1990) [hereinafter Hearing
Record] (emphasis supplied).
2. This practice is known in the direct mall industry as "profiling." Swedes Worry
That European Community Membership Will Compromise Databases, COMPUTERGRAM
INT'L, Jan. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, NEXIS World Library, Txtline File.
3. Peter Kerr, Big Credit Bureau to Let Consumers See Reports Free, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
15, 1991, at Al.
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"for a reasonable charge," 4 nothing other than corporate discretion
prevents credit reporting agencies from selling those personal
records to whomever they choose.
The most intimate personal information regarding nearly every
American adult, including age, marital status, salary, home address
and phone, medical procedures paid for (or unpaid for), and debts
owed, is thereby freely traded, without the authorization of the indi-
vidual from whom it was collected. Not only does this practice in-
trude on individual privacy by its unauthorized disclosure of
personal data, it also perpetuates an economic imbalance. Private
companies with the resources to collect or purchase personal data
are presently able to exploit that information virtually free from leg-
islative restraint and gain economically without compensating the
people whom that data describes, or protecting them in case dam-
age ensues due to its mishandling.
The 1989 murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer is an extreme,
though illustrative example of the destruction that the lack of infor-
mational privacy can cause. Ms. Schaeffer, the co-star of the televi-
sion series "My Sister Sam," was killed outside her Los Angeles
apartment by an obsessed fan who acquired her address from the
California Department of Motor Vehicles.5
Although governmentally-held personal information is pur-
portedly protected from misuse,6 no such restrictions on the DMV's
distribution of this personal data existed at the time of Ms. Schaef-
fer's death. The lack of protection for similar records retained in
innumerable private sector databases reveals the potential for abuse
of the personal information of every citizen.
Consider, for example, what happened to Supreme Court nom-
inee Robert Bork during his confirmation hearings. A Washington
D.C. weekly newspaper published a list of the 146 videotapes Bork
and his wife had rented over a two year period.' Fortunately for
Mr. Bork and his wife, their videotape choices were socially inoffen-
4. The Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act § 612, 15 U.S.C. § 1681j (1988).
5. James Harney, DMV" Registered Driver: License Plate: Confidentiality, USA TO-
DAY, Mar. 10, 1992, at 3A.
6. The Privacy Act of 1974 provides: "No agency shall disclose any record.., by any
means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant to a written
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record per-
tains .... 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988).
Similarly, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 provides that: "[N]o Government
authority may have access to ... the information contained in the financial records of any
customer from a financial institution unless ... such customer has authorized such disclosure
..... 12 U.S.C. § 3402(l) (1988).
7. Personalities, WASH. PosT, Sept. 26, 1987, at C3.
[Vol. 9
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
sive. Had the list included pornography or other provocative mate-
rial, damage to his career or their marriage may have been great.
In response to that incident, Congress passed the Video Pri-
vacy Protection Act,8 proscribing disclosure of personal data by
"videotape service provider[s]." 9 However, there is no similar pro-
tection for records about the purchase of magazines, books, music,
computer software, mail order merchandise, airline tickets, foods,
film developing and the range of consumer goods and services
purchased by American citizens. 10 Companies are free to collect
and sell this information without restriction or notice to consum-
ers."1 The following troubling examples illustrate the extensive po-
tential for privacy invasions permitted by the current lack of
protections.
Purchasers of pregnancy-testing kits may receive solicitations
from pro- and anti-abortion groups, or from sellers of birth-con-
trol products and diaper services. Purchasers of weight-loss
products or participants in diet programs may be targeted for
promotional offers from sellers of candy, cookies and ice cream,
or, conversely, those whose purchases of the latter exceed the
average may receive offers for weight-loss products and services.
Subscribers to gay and lesbian publications may be targeted by
religious and therapeutic organizations or face employment deni-
als, harassment, and even blackmail. Frequent travelers and
those with multiple residences may receive solicitations from sell-
ers of home-security products, and such lists would be a boon to
sophisticated burglars. A list of tobacco users might be of inter-
est to potential employers and insurance companies. A list of
those with credit troubles and excessive indebtedness would cer-
tainly be of interest to promoters of scams that promise to help
people obtain credit cards or get out of debt. A cynic might even
hypothesize that such a list would be used by promoters of alco-
holic beverages, sweepstakes advertising, and gambling junkets. 12
Individuals are also not protected from the errors made by
mailing-list merchants. According to Bankcard Holders of
8. The Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-618, 102 Stat. 1395
(1988) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988)).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). The Act provides: "A video tape service provider who
knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any con-
sumer of such provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person for the relief provided in sub-
section (d)." Id.
10. See 137 CONG. REc. H755, H756 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1991) [hereinafter Rep. Wise's
Introductory Remarks] (statement of Rep. Wise introducing H.R. 685).
11. Id.
12. Gary T. Marx, Privacy and Technology, WHOLE EARTH REV., Winter 1991, at 90,
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America, a consumer advocacy group, thirty-five percent of those
who pay to see their own credit reports find that their credit report
contains someone else's data. 3
[In one such incident,] Michael Riley, a Washington-based Time
magazine reporter, jumped at the mail solicitation he received in
late 1989 for a pre-approved Citibank visa card. A few weeks
later, his wife, Arline, was about to buy a blouse when the cash-
ier told her the card was no good.
When the Rileys checked further with Citibank, they were
told that their car had been repossessed, they faced $70,000 in
tax liens and that they had filed for bankruptcy. As it turned
out, Citibank, which had purchased its credit information from
TRW, according to Riley, had confused Michael George Riley
with a Michael Gilbert Riley.14
Horror stories like this could be avoided if legislation required that
data collectors acquire the data subject's consent prior to distribut-
ing personal information.
Medical records are similarly unprotected. Health insurers
maintain vast databases of patients' medical records, which the in-
surers claim they keep private. 5 But self-insured employers also
have access to such data which they can use to educate or even
discipline employees. 6 Only employer discretion, not legislation or
regulation, determines how employee medical records are used. 7
The marketing industry claims that access to such information
is vital to the health of their business.'I The claims are that no harm
is done to the consumer by the free dissemination of this informa-
tion. On the contrary, argue claim marketers, the consumer is able
to enjoy greater, focused access to the products she wants and will
receive less junk mail if tailored marketing can be achieved via free
access to this personal data.'9 But this argument ignores the threats
to personal privacy engendered by the unrestricted free trade in per-
sonal data.
While large marketing firms may have security measures in
place to prevent disclosure of the personal data in their computer
13. Daniel Mendel-Black & Evelyn Richards, Peering Into Private Lives: Computer Lists
Now Profile Consumers by their Personal Habits, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1991, at HI, H6.
14. Id.
15. Milt Freudenheirn, Software Controls on Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992,
at D2.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Mendel-Black & Richards, supra note 13, at H6.
19. See id.
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memories to those who might mishandle that data, smaller compa-
nies might not be able to afford such care. Smaller companies also
might not have the assets to recompense a consumer damaged by
the misuse of her data.
Nonetheless, in order to offer marketing opportunities to small
businesses, Lotus Development and Equifax were planning to mar-
ket a CD-ROM product known as Lotus Marketplace: Households
("Marketplace") in 1991.20 The Marketplace database cataloged
information on 80 million households" and 120 million consum-
ers22 including names, addresses, estimated income, and propensity
to buy over 100 consumer product categories.23 The product was to
retail for $695, and was targeted at small businesses.24 But Market-
place was never released because some 30,000 consumers demanded
that their names be removed from the CD-ROM.25 However, no
existing legislation would have prevented its sale. The protection of
personal privacy should not depend merely on consumer protests,
the timely reporting of a potentially threatening product's release,
or the fortuitous decision of company executives.
Protection of personal data in the private sector historically
has been provided by legislation tailored to remedy narrowly per-
ceived problems. Congress has passed legislation to protect con-
sumer's informational privacy in the financial,26 cable television,27
and the video retailing industries.2" Such niche legislation, how-
ever, does not effectively protect personal privacy across the broad
spectrum of situations where it is threatened.
Personal data is also protected by the private sector itself, but
only when it serves private sector interests. As noted by the Chief
Executive Officer of Citicorp's Point-of-Sale Information Services,
Jerry Saltzgaber, "[t]hose of us involved in consumer marketing are
the best agents for protecting the consumer's privacy, because if we
don't, we won't have a business."29
However, there is an inherent conflict of interests when compa-
nies serve as both collectors and protectors of personal data. Ar-
20. Jacob Sullun, Secrets for Sale: Do Strangers with Computers Know Too Much About
You?, REASON, Vol. 23, April 1992, at 29.
21. Mendel-Black & Richards, supra note 13, at HI.
22. Sullum, supra note 20, at 29.
23. See Mendel-Black & Richards, supra note 13, at HI.
24. Sullum, supra note 20, at 29.
25. Id.
26. Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 §§ 1101-22, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1988).
27. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 § 631, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (1988).
28. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 § 2(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
29. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 88.
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guably, when a company is threatened by an economic recession,
for example, one cannot expect it to put consumers' interests above
its own. Nor can it be expected to forego the exploitation of all its
assets, including its consumer database, to protect its business inter-
ests. Thus personal data is subject to the vagaries of the economy
and corporate discretion. Such an insecure system for protecting
personal data is inadequate to guarantee informational privacy
rights. Individuals need protection from the private sector itself,
both from unnecessary collection of personal data and from its un-
authorized disclosure.
In an attempt to reconcile the interests of personal privacy and
American business development, Representative Robert Wise of
West Virginia has proposed the establishment of a Data Protection
Board (DPB).30 Rep. Wise's bill is an idea whose time has come,3 1
but the proposed "watchdog"3 2 DPB has not been provided with
the teeth to accomplish its stated purpose. As proposed, the DPB
only has advisory power.33
The "Functions of the Board" section of the House bill34 pro-
vides that the DPB shall develop guidelines for use by Federal agen-
cies in implementing the Privacy Protection Act of 197435 (the
"Privacy Act").36 In addition, with respect to the Privacy Act, the
DPB shall assist federal agencies, publish a guide, issue advisory
opinions, investigate compliance, and make recommendations for
amending the Freedom of Information Act 37 and the Privacy Act. 38
Representative Wise has proposed two goals for the DPB: to
protect personal privacy and to ensure that American businesses
can compete in the European Community. 39 However, neither goal
30. H.R. 685, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
31. A Data Protection Board has been proposed in Congress at least twice before. Rep.
Wise introduced a bill to establish such a board on November 15, 1989. H.R. 3669, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Senator Samuel J. Ervin, Jr. introduced S. 3418 (which was passed to
become the Privacy Act of 1974) to create a Federal Privacy Board on May 1, 1974.
In addition, the Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, § 3(2), 101 Stat.
1724, 1724-25 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 278g-3(a)(3) (1988)), mandated that the National In-
stitute of Standards and Technology develop "standards and guidelines for the cost-effective
security and privacy of sensitive information in Federal computer systems." Id.
32. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H756.
33. H.R. 685 § 2(c)(2)(A).
34. Provision (c) in H.R. 685, "Functions of the Board," would become section 5(c) of
the Privacy Act of 1974. H.R. 685 § 2.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988). The Privacy Act of 1974 protects individuals from unau-
thorized disclosures of personal data by the federal government. Id.
36. H.R. 685 § 2(c)(l)(A).
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
38. H.R. 685 § 2(c).
39. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H755-56.
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will be well served by a government board charged with merely
"guiding," "opining" and "recommending" means of achieving in-
formational privacy. Furthermore, a DPB whose primary legisla-
tive guides are the Privacy Act of 1974 and the Freedom of
Information Act (which regulate governmentally held personal
data) will have little impact on private sector users of consumer
data.
The lack of a central U.S. data protection authority (like the
DPB) has also left American industry unrepresented when interna-
tional decisions are made about transborder data use by multina-
tional companies. Furthermore, the data protection legislation of
many countries prevents the transfer of personal data to another
country in the absence of reciprocal data protection legislation,'
which ensures that personal data will be as well protected in the
transferee country as it was in its native country. The U.S. has no
such reciprocal legislation.
The European Commission has issued draft Directives that
would preclude transfers of personal data between countries that
have not "ensure[d] an adequate level of protection."41 The Com-
mission may decide that a particular country has adequate personal
data protection by reason either of its international commitments or
domestic law.42 Rep. Wise noted that "[a]doption of this Directive
[without concomitant legislation in the U.S.] could make it expen-
sive or impossible for American companies that need to transfer
personal data to and from Europe to do business. The result could
be a loss of jobs, profits, and business opportunities for America."43
The conflict between the United States' need for open access to
the EC market and the EC's intention to require reciprocal data
protection laws poses an economic imperative for the United States.
Failure to put adequate data protection laws in place and represent
U.S. business interests in this regard may cause U.S. businesses to
suffer.' American banks, for example, which are prevented from
transferring personal account data from Switzerland to New York
will find it difficult to compete in the transnational market with
Swiss banks which face no such impediment to transferring data.45
40. See Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 3.
41. Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Protection of Individuals in Relation
to the Processing of Personal Data, art. 24.1, 1990 O.J. (c277) 3,10 [hereinafter Draft
Directive].
42. Id. at 10.
43. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H756.
44. Id.
45. See id. Rep. Wise noted in his Opening Statement before the Subcommittee Hear-
1993]
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The United States is faced with either creating legislation to
protect personal data and national business interests, or subjecting
American companies to a regulatory apparatus controlled in Brus-
sels, review of American companies' management practices by Eu-
ropean bureaucrats and the determination by European courts of
American companies' legal liabilities.46
Recognizing, at least for argument's sake, that this latter alter-
native is not workable, the problem is how to balance the privacy
concerns of American consumers and the European Commission
against the profit-driven needs of American companies. Achieving
this balance will ensure a competitive position for U.S. businesses in
the E.C., and privacy protection for people.
The solution consistently chosen to resolve related problems by
the U.S. government47 and EC countries48 is a simple one. Compa-
nies can satisfy privacy concerns by merely obtaining permission to
use personal data (for purposes other than the purpose for which it
was provided) from the source-individual. Business' resistance to
adopting this solution on its own is great, due to perceived costs and
a perceived loss of autonomy to exploit information. 49  However,
such resistance can be neutralized, adherence ensured across the
private sector, and reciprocal legislation requirements fulfilled if
federal legislation is passed compelling businesses to acquire an in-
dividual's authorization prior to disclosing (or otherwise making
use of) her personal data.
In order to demonstrate the viability of adopting such legisla-
ings on the DPB bill that "[r]ecently, for instance, the French data protection commission
stopped Fiat in France from transferring information about its employees to Fiat in Italy."
Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 3.
46. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H757.
47. The Privacy Act of 1974 provides: "No agency shall disclose any record ... except
pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom
the record pertains .... 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1988) (emphasis supplied). The Right to Fi-
nancial Privacy Act of 1978 provides that "no Government authority may have access to...
the information contained in the financial records of any customer from a financial institution
unless... such customer has authorized such disclosure .... " 12 U.S.C. § 3402(1) (1988)
(emphasis supplied).
48. The Directives proposed by the European Commission in July 1990 seek to harmo-
nize the data protection laws of EC countries. Most of those countries, however, including
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain Switzer-
land and the United Kingdom already have data protection laws which require that stored
data be used only for the purposes stated when the data was originally collected. Those same
laws provide the data subject with objection, correction and erasure rights regarding personal
data. European Data Protection Survey, BULL. (Info. Technology Law Group/Eur.) Issue 6,
Autumn 1991.
49. Lovella Miles, Feeling the Draft; European Community's Data Protection Directive,
MARKETING, May 30, 1991, at 16.
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tion, this article will examine the legal and policy bases for such a
privacy law and will explain why this form of privacy protection
will provide benefits to all involved parties, far outweighing any po-
tential harms.
II. BASES FOR PROTECTING INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
A. Constitutional Basis for Protecting Informational Privacy
Although the United States Constitution does not contain the
word "privacy," the Supreme Court has recognized various privacy
rights based on several of the Amendments. Justice Douglas out-
lined the "zones of privacy" protected by the Bill of Rights in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.50
The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
Amendment is [a zone of privacy]. The Third Amendment in its
prohibition against the quartering of soldiers "in any house" in
time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of
that privacy. The Fourth Amendment explicitly affirms the
"right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment
provides: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people."51
Griswold represented the. Supreme Court's first recognition of a
fundamental privacy right. Douglas' opinion held that Connecti-
cut's anti-contraceptive statute violated the right of marital privacy,
a right "older than the Bill of Rights."52
However, while the Griswold Justices agreed that there was a
"right to privacy," they disagreed about the constitutional basis for
the right.53 Eight years later, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe v.
50. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 486.
53. Justice Goldberg attributed the "fundamental personal [privacy] right" to those
unenumerated rights retained by the people pursuant to the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 486-
87.
Justice Harlan applied a traditional due process analysis, holding that the Connecticut
statute violated "basic values 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'." Id. at 500 (citing
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
Justice White also found that the Connecticut Statute imposed on a Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty which he defined as "a 'realm of family life which the state cannot enter' without
19931
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Wade 4 identified the source of Giswold's "right to privacy" as the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 55
Douglas' "zones of privacy" were further defined in the
Court's decisions following Griswold. The Court found that the
Due Process Clause's substantive protection for "fundamental"
rights safeguards the right to decide to marry, 6 the right to decide
to end a pregnancy, 7 and the right of parents to make decisions
regarding the education and upbringing of their children. 8
The series of Supreme Court decisions leading from Griswold
was narrowed by Justice White's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick59
to "a fundamental individual right to decide whether or not to beget
or bear a child."' The Bowers Court claimed that "none of the
rights announced in [the Griswold line of] cases bears any resem-
blance to the claimed constitutional right of homosexuals to engage
in acts of sodomy,"61 thereby upholding Georgia's anti-sodomy
statute. Justice White's opinion shifted the Court's focus and hold-
ing away from the right to privacy to the very narrow right to en-
gage in sodomy. Justice Blackmun's dissent acknowledged this
shift, reasoning that
[t]his case is [not] about "a fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy".... Rather, this case is about "the most com-
prehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,"
namely, "the right to be let alone." 62
By narrowly construing its prior privacy-related holdings, the
Bowers Court ignored the Due Process basis for the right to privacy
as identified in Roe. Instead, the Court relied on historical notions
of liberty which precluded finding that the right to engage in sod-
omy was a "fundamental" right.63
substantial justification." Id. at 502 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1943)).
54. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
55. Id. at 153 ("This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's concept of... liberty ... as we feel it is, or ... in the Ninth Amendment ... is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.") (em-
phasis supplied).
56. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
58. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 708 (1977)(Powell, J., concurring);
and Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
59. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
60. Id. at 190.
61. Id at 190-191.
62. Id. at 199 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
63. Id. at 192-194.
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The Court also constricted the right to privacy in Paul v. Da-
vis.6" That decision denied constitutional protection against the
public disclosure by police of the respondent's arrest on a shoplift-
ing charge, even though the respondent had never been convicted.65
The Court characterized the respondent's claim as defamation, and
therefore not within the meaning of either "liberty" or "property"
as used in the Due Process Clause.66
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion distinguished "fundamen-
tal" privacy rights "relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, and child rearing and education" from
the right to non-disclosure of personal information.6 7 The opinion
foreclosed Due Process protection of informational privacy unless
unauthorized disclosure threatens the exercise of "fundamental"
rights. Rather, Justice Rehnquist suggested the respondent seek re-
lief via his state's tort laws. 68
In a contrasting opinion issued a year later, Whalen v. Roe,69
Justice Stevens wrote that "[tihe right to collect and use [personal]
data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures ....
[I]n some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the Con-
stitution ... ."70 The opinion recognized that the privacy which the
Due Process Clause safeguards includes two different types of inter-
ests: "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal mat-
ters, and.., the interest in independence in making certain kinds of
important decisions. '71
Read together, the Davis and Whalen opinions bear out one
commentator's conclusion that "the Supreme Court suffers from a
severe case of schizophrenia. '72 Justice Stevens' acknowledgment
in Whalen of Due Process Clause protection for "disclosure of per-
sonal matters" contradicts Justice Rehnquist's denial in Davis of the
Due Process right to informational privacy. The second right noted
by Justice Stevens, however, the right to autonomy in personal deci-
sion-making, is consistent with the Griswold line of cases, and with
64. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 711-12.
67. Id. at 713.
68. Id. at 712.
69. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
70. Id. at 605.
71. Id. at 599-600.
72. Michael P. Seng, The Constitution and Informational Privacy, or How So-Called
Conservatives Countenance Governmental Intrusion into a Person's Private Affairs, 18 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 871, 875 (1985).
1993]
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Davis's protection against unauthorized disclosure when such dis-
closure threatens the exercise of "fundamental" rights.
This reasoning is bolstered by the Court's decision in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services.73 In that case, the Court held
that President Nixon's assertions of informational privacy in his of-
ficial records were outweighed by a public interest in the docu-
ments. The Court's use of a balancing test implies that the Court
recognized a Constitutional right to informational privacy. If Presi-
dent Nixon did not have such a right, such balancing by the Court
would have been unnecessary.74
The Court has also employed a balancing test to weigh "the
right of every person 'to be let alone' ... [against] the right of [busi-
nesses] to communicate. ' 75  In Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Depart-
ment,76  mailing list brokers brought suit to challenge the
constitutionality of a statute77 which required removal of consum-
ers' names from mailing lists at the consumers' request. 78  The
Court found that the statute violated neither the First Amend-
ment's "right to communicate' 79 nor the Due Process Clause.8"
The Court affirmed the consumer's right to control the contents of
her mailbox and the use of her name and address because "[t]o hold
less would tend to license a form of trespass," and because
"[n]othing in the Constitution compels us to listen to or view any
unwanted communication."" Thus Chief Justice Burger's opinion
found the right to privacy, in the context of prohibiting pandering
73. 433 U.S. 425 (1977). "One element of privacy has been characterized as 'the indi-
vidual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters ....... Id. at 457 (quoting Whalen,
429 U.S. at 599).
74. William C. Lindsay, When Uncle Sam Calls Does Ma Bell Have to Answer?; Recog-
nizing a Constitutional Right to Corporate Informational Privacy, 18 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
915, 920 (1985).
75. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970).
76. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
77. Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, 39 U.S.C. § 4009
(1964, Supp. IV).
78. 39 U.S.C. § 4009 ... provides that
a person who has received by mail "a pandering advertisement which offers for
sale matter which the addressee in his sole discretion believes to be erotically
arousing or sexually provocative," may request the Postmaster General to issue
an order "directing the sender and his agents or assigns to refrain from further
mailings to the named addressee." Such order would also require the sender to
delete the addressee's name from his mailing lists and would prohibit him from
trading in lists from which the deletion has not been made.
397 U.S. at 728.
79. Id. at 735.
80. Id. at 738.
81. Id. at 737.
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advertisements in the mails, greater than businesses' right to
communicate.
The Rowan decision provides a basis for individual control
over the exploitation of personal information. The opinion clearly
finds that one aspect of commercial solicitation is not necessarily
protected under the First Amendment. Despite the limited focus of
the statute challenged in Rowan, the Court found Congress' intent
to be quite broad:
In operative effect the power of the householder under the statute
is unlimited; he may prohibit ihe mailing of a dry goods catalog
because he objects to the contents - or indeed the text of the lan-
guage touting the merchandise. Congress provided this sweeping
power not only to protect privacy but to avoid possible constitu-
tional questions that might arise from vesting the power to make
any discretionary evaluation of the material in a governmental
official.
In effect, Congress has erected a wall - or more accurately
permits a citizen to erect a wall - that no advertiser may pene-
trate without his acquiescence.8 2
Although the Court has not found informational privacy to be
a fundamental right, its decisions support the notion that the indi-
vidual's right to informational privacy exists, and must be balanced
against the public interest.
As new technologies make collection of information about in-
dividuals easier and more insidious, the Court will increasingly be
faced with decisions whether to allow intrusion into what Justices
Warren and Brandeis termed the "inviolate personality" of the pri-
vate individual.8 3 To allow such intrusion will further limit individ-
ual liberty, will discourage personal autonomy and will surely usher
in an era of "Big Brother," where the individual is unable to con-
tribute to the greater human good for fear of incurring the govern-
ment's wrath.
Although statutory protection (as urged by this article) is es-
sential to ensure that businesses and individuals know their rights
and responsibilities regarding informational privacy, such rights
will be secure only if they are Constitutionally protected. One way
82. Id. at 737-38.
83. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 205, 207, 213 (1890). Warren and Brandeis also noted that "[i]f we are correct in this
conclusion [the existence of a right to privacy based on an inviolate personality], the existing
law affords a principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual from
invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or the possessor of any other
modem device .. " Id. at 206.
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to overcome the Court's selective application of the right to privacy
is to amend the Constitution to acknowledge that its protections
apply regardless of the technologies which threaten our freedoms.
Professor Laurence H. Tribe has proposed the following 27th Con-
stitutional Amendment to address the threats to the Constitution's
core values in the technological age.
This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech, press,
petitions, and assembly, and its protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures and the deprivation of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law, shall be construed as fully appli-
cable without regard to the technological method or medium
through which information content is generated, stored, altered,
transmitted, or controlled. 4
Professor Tribe's proposed Amendment is necessary to guaran-
tee that the values of freedom, privacy and equality protected by the
18th century Bill of Rights continue unfettered. It would be more
comforting if the Supreme Court itself were to consistently interpret
the terms of the Constitution so that, for example, the right to pri-
vacy found in the Due Process Clause applied equally whether one
freely provided a personal phone number, or it was acquired with-
out one's permission via Caller I.D. technology.
85
But the Court's decisions are not so consistent. For example,
while Roe v. Wade86 acknowledged a woman's right to choose how
she uses her body, Bowers v. Hardwick '7 deprived homosexuals of
that same right. Though these cases are based on physically-ori-
ented rights, the rights we have in intangible personalty, like our
personal information, are no less precious and no less deserving of
protection.
In the context of achieving consistency in the protection of fun-
damental rights across technologies, acceptance of Professor Tribe's
proposal is appropriate. But in the context of non-fundamental
rights such as informational privacy, it is insufficient. Protection of
informational privacy requires legislation tailored to the reality of
the marketplace. Such legislation will not merely assert the exist-
ence of such rights regardless of technology, but will also satisfy the
84. John Markhoff, Remember Big Brother? Now He's a Company Man, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1991, at E7.
85. Caller I.D. is a technological service provided by telephone companies in 22 states
which "allows a subscriber to identify and record the telephone number of an incoming call,
and therefore presumably to determine the caller's identity." Anthony Ramirez, New York
State Approves Caller-Identification Service, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1992, at Dl.
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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commercial need for information in a manner that is fair to the
consumer.
B. Legislative Basis for Protecting Informational Privacy
If the Supreme Court has stopped short of expressly recogniz-
ing the right to informational privacy, Congress has not been so
timid. Congress' recognition of privacy rights is manifest in the
proliferation of legislation protecting the individual from govern-
mental intrusion88 and from the exploitation of personal data by
private organizations.
For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 197089 prohibits
consumer reporting agencies from disclosing consumer data except
in specified circumstances. 90 The Right to Financial Privacy Act of
197891 provides individuals with the right to notice of a request
before a financial institution may disclose records to government
agencies.92 The Cable Communications Policy Act of 198493 pro-
hibits cable operators from disclosing personal data regarding sub-
scribers without the consent of the subscriber.94 The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 198695 protects against the unau-
thorized interception of electronic communications.96 The Video
Privacy Protection Act of 198897 protects personal data held by
videotape service providers.98
These laws clearly express that Congress has perceived the
need to protect individual privacy. For example, included among
the Congressional findings regarding the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) is the following:
There is a need to insure that consumer reporting agencies exer-
cise their grave responsibilities with... a respect for the con-
sumer's right to privacy. 99
88. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988); Crime Control Act of 1973
§ 812, 42 U.S.C. § 3789g (1988); Privacy Act of 1974 § 3, 5 U.S.C. 552a (1988); Right to
Financial Privacy Act of 1978 §§ 1101-22, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1988); Privacy Protection
Act of 1980 § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa-I I to -12 (1988).
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1988).
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
91. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1988).
92. 12 U.S.C. § 3403(a).
93. 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (1988).
94. 47 U.S.C. § 551(c)(1).
95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-21 (1988).
96. 18 U.S.C. § 2511.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
98. Id.
99. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(4).
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Ironically, the FCRA focuses little on privacy, and primarily
on the accuracy of information held by consumer reporting agen-
cies. Although it restricts distribution of credit reports to certain
"permissible purposes," 1°° it does not prohibit general disclosure of
consumer data. 101 Thus, although Congress' intention in enacting
the FCRA, and the other legislation noted above, was to protect
consumer privacy, these laws fall short of this goal.
Congress has recognized the need for and demonstrated a de-
sire to protect personal privacy and commercial access to informa-
tion, but has thus far failed to enact legislation that accomplishes
both purposes in a comprehensive, effective manner. Satisfaction of
Congress' intentions requires a law that establishes privacy stan-
dards for all industries to follow, and a mechanism to ensure its
enforcement.
C. Common-Law Basis for Protecting Informational Privacy
1. Tort
Justice Rehnquist's assertion in Paul v. Davis 102 that individu-
als must look to state tort law to protect their privacy1°3 acknowl-
edges that such protection exists. Indeed, the common-law right of
privacy has traditionally given rise to a tort action for a violation of
that right.
Dean Prosser has identified four generally recognized state tort
actions for invasion of privacy:1 4 intrusion on physical solitude and
seclusion,10 5 public disclosure of private facts,1"6 false light in the
public eye, 10 7 and appropriation of one's name or likeness. 0 8 In the
context of informational privacy, two of the actions described by
Prosser are material: intrusion and public disclosure.
A tortious intrusion of an individual's privacy may stem from
the fact that corporations sell personal information without the au-
thorization of the individual from whom it was collected. The ini-
tial collecting of information may not constitute an intrusion on the
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b.
101. The allowable circumstances for furnishing a consumer report include "a legitimate
business need ... in connection with a business transaction involving the consumer." Id.
§ 1681b(3)(E).
102. 424 U.S. 693 (1976)
103. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
104. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804 (4th ed. 1971).
105. Id. at 807.
106. Id. at 809.
107. Id at 812.
108. Id. at 804.
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individual. In fact, the individual seeking a magazine subscription,
or insurance, or credit may initiate and volunteer information.
However, when the collecting corporation sells that information to
a third party, it provides the third party with unauthorized access
to personal facts regarding the individual and is thereby intruding
on the individual.
Prosser notes that this "form of invasion of privacy consists of
intrusion upon the [individual's] physical solitude or seclusion."1 9
In the context of informational privacy, courts have found a tor-
tious violation of this interest where there was prying into confiden-
tial records such as bank records.11°
Similarly, the selling or leasing of personal data constitutes a
public disclosure of private facts. While the sale of a list of con-
sumer data by one company to another may not appear to be "pub-
lic" disclosure, list brokers sell thousands of lists every year, and
such a distribution has been held to be public."' Also, consider the
Marketplace information product announced in April 1990 by Lo-
tus Development and Equifax, but never released. 1 2 By offering
the names, addresses and consumer habits of 120 million Americans
to small businesses, Marketplace assured a wide (public) disclosure
of private facts and therefore a tortious invasion of informational
privacy.
Despite the seemingly viable claim that the practice of selling
mailing lists is an invasion of privacy by intrusion into another's
seclusion, most such cases result in findings of nonliability.'13 It
appears that courts are very reluctant to find damage to the con-
sumer and resultant liability to the data collector/distributor based
on mere unauthorized disclosure of personal information. 1 4 This
result is unjust, but not unexpected, given a legal tradition which
provides for tort recovery only when some palpable damage can be
shown. The damage which results from an invasion of informa-
tional privacy is more commonly in the realm of lost opportunity
than in physical or mental suffering. Thus claims based on viola-
109. Id. at 807.
110. Brex v. Smith, 146 A. 34 (N.J. Ch. 1929).
111. See STANDARD RATE & DATA SERVICE, DIREcT MAIL LIsT RATES AND DATA
(April 1993); Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, 127 P.2d 577 (Cal. Ct. App. 1942) (holding the
distribution of a letter to a thousand men to be a public distribution).
112. See supra notes 20 - 25 and accompanying text.
113. Jeffrey F. Ghent, Unsolicited Mailing, Distribution, House Call, or Telephone Call as
Invasion of Privacy, 56 A.L.R.3d 457 §§ 8-16 (1974).
114. Id.
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tions of property rights and, more likely, breach of contract present
stronger bases for successful actions.
2. Property
Defining information as property and affording rights to infor-
mation "owners" makes for a prescient argument. American intel-
lectual property law has historically resisted conferring property
rights to the possessor of information." 5 Rather, its goal has been
the free circulation of information. Even more significantly, the ex-
isting statutory scheme for protecting intangible property does not
provide for the essential difference between information and tangi-
ble property. Specifically, tangible property decreases in value
when it is divided, while information does not." 6
As the concentration of wealth in information increases, a legal
scheme for protecting information rights will emerge of necessity.
Property laws have historically developed in response to new defini-
tions of wealth. Such laws will be based on an expanded definition
of property which will encompass claims of informational privacy.
Until these new laws are written, the copyright and patent schemes
provide an exceedingly insufficient model for protection of rights in
information.
The Constitutional clause on which the patent and copyright
laws are based grants Congress the power "to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." 1 7 The statutes based on this clause have sought to
balance the free dissemination of ideas against the state's interest in
encouraging authors and inventors to maintain the "Progress of Sci-
ence and useful Arts." Thus protection of author's and inventor's
rights is limited to providing a financial return on their expressions,
(not their ideas) for a limited time only. 1 8
In the case of copyright law, authors are granted the exclusive
115. See Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of Inter-
national News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CM. L. REV. 411, 411 (1983) ("That informa-
tion once published should be presumptively free for all to use is a commonplace of
intellectual property law.").
116. Thomas Jefferson wrote of information's unique ability to be infinitely divisible
without losing value in 1813: "He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening
me." 6 WRrINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 180 (H. A. Washington ed., 1857).
117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
118. Current copyright law provides for rights to last for the life of the author plus 50
years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988). Patent rights are granted for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154
(1988).
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right to copy, distribute, perform, display and license their cre-
ations, 1 9 thereby protecting the author's right to profit from the
work. The information (ideas) contained in the work, however, are
essentially public domain material. 2 '
In Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service, 2' the United
States Supreme Court asserted that facts are uncopyrightable be-
cause they are "discovered" by humans rather than "created."' 22
The Copyright Act of 1976 as amended'23 provides that copyright
protection does not extend to discoveries, even when embodied in a
copyrighted work. 12 4
Similarly, patent law grants to the inventor the right to exclude
others from making, using and selling a patented invention. 5
Although patents themselves "shall have the attributes of personal
property,"' 26 the information on which the invention is based is
public domain when the patent is granted.'2 7
In dramatic contravention of the intellectual property tradition
of denying property rights in information, two recent Supreme
Court decisions classified information as private property. 128  In
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,129 the Court held that research data
submitted to a federal agency could be considered 'property' within
the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. 30 In
Carpenter v. United States,'3' the Court held that a newspaper "had
a property right in keeping confidential and making exclusive use,
119. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
120. Section 107 of the Copyright Act provides in pertinent part that "use of a copy-
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or... by any other means... for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching. . ., scholarship, or research,
is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988) (emphasis supplied).
121. 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991).
122. Id. at 1287.
123. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
124. Id. § 102(b).
125. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1988).
126. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1988).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 113 (1988) provides that: "[t]he applicant shall furnish a drawing where
necessary for the understanding of the subject matter sought to be patented." (emphasis sup-
plied). 35 U.S.C. § 10 (1988) provides that "[t]he Commissioner may furnish certified copies
of specifications and drawings of patents issued by the Patent and Trademark Office, and of
other records available either to the public or the person applying therefore." (emphasis
supplied).
128. For an in-depth analysis of these two cases and the issue of whether property rights
may exist in information, see Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus
and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L.
REv. 365 (1989).
129. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
130. Id. at 1003.
131. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
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prior to publication," of the contents of a newspaper column.132
These two cases are the forerunners of a new concept about the
legal status of information, a concept more appropriate to the
changes wrought by the use of new technologies. If the informa-
tional rights of artificial persons like Monsanto 133 and the Wall
Street Journal 134 are protected, it follows that the personal data of
human beings is similarly deserving of protection.
Congress has clearly recognized the necessity that digitized in-
formation be considered "property." In the Senate Report on the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986,131 the Committee on the
Judiciary noted that a slew of enforcement problems had arisen in
response to criminal conduct related to computers. "Computer
technology simply does not fit some of the older, more traditional
legal approaches to theft or abuse of property. For example, com-
puter data may be 'stolen' in the sense that it is copied by an unau-
thorized user, even though the original data has not been removed
or altered in any way." 136 The Committee found that these enforce-
ment problems could be alleviated by recognizing computerized in-
formation as property. 137
Recognition of the need to classify information as property is
the first step towards protection of the bundle of rights that give
property its value. But that recognition has only begun to creep
into the minds of Justices and Congresspeople. Meanwhile, infor-
mational privacy is threatened by unregulated data merchants.
Therefore, a more ready basis for protection than property law must
be considered.
3. Contract
One of the primary tenets of informational privacy is that per-
sonal information collected for one purpose may not be disclosed
for another purpose without the data subject's consent. The fact
that an individual subscribes to a tennis magazine, for example, is
not an invitation to tennis equipment manufacturers to mail adver-
132. Id. at 25-26. Carpenter also references another Supreme Court case that recognizes
a property right in information, specifically the news: International News Serv. v. Associated
Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918).
133. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
134. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
135. S. REP. No. 432, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479.
136. 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N., supra note 134, at 2491.
137. Id. at 2492 ("The Committee intends S.2281 to affirm the government's recognition
of computerized information as property.") The House bill was passed in lieu of the Senate
bill after amending its language to contain much of the text of the Senate bill. Id. at 2479.
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tisements to that individual. The danger is not in the receipt of
unwanted mail. Rather, there is danger in societal acceptance of
the idea that personal information is not subject to the individual's
control. An extreme result of such a system is that total strangers
may become privy to sensitive or (in the case of Rebecca Schaef-
fer)13' dangerous information.
When a consumer provides information in conjunction with a
purchase, there is an implicit contract. In the case of a magazine
subscription, the consumer pays a subscription fee and provides a
mailing address in order to receive a publication. The contract thus
entails an agreement that the consumer's information (her name
and address) will be used for the single purpose of delivering
magazines.
When the publisher sells its subscription list to a third party, it
does so in violation of the subscription "contract," and without the
consent of the subscribers. List purchasers receive not only the sub-
scriber's name and address, but also the information that each per-
son on the list subscribed to a particular publication. This
information can imply the financial position and social habits of the
subscribers.
But even though the sale of mailing lists is common, the con-
sumer is not implicitly consenting to the sale of her address when
she purchases a magazine. Publishers seem to recognize this and
occasionally provide a disclaimer enabling purchasers to be re-
moved from shared mailing lists upon request. 139 While the pres-
ence of such a disclaimer might defeat a breach of contract claim by
implying consent, disclaimers do not comprise actual consent, espe-
cially when hidden in the fine print, or when absent.
There are several reasons why basing an informational privacy
claim on a contract theory could prove difficult. In Shibley v.
Time,1 " the Ohio Court of Appeals found no invasion of privacy
where the subscribers/plaintiffs claimed the publisher's sale of mail-
ing lists amounted to the unconsented sale of individual "personal-
ity profiles," resulting in the publisher's unjust enrichment at the
subscribers' expense. 141
The Shibley opinion provides two significant reasons why any
common law action, including breach of contract, provides a weak
tool for pursuing an informational privacy claim. The primary diffi-
138. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
139. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 60-73.
140. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
141. Id.
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culty for such a claimant is that the right of informational privacy is
not widely recognized.14 2 Without a right to privacy, the right of
consent regarding that privacy is moot. Secondly, the court noted
that "the practice complained of here [the sale of subscription lists]
does not constitute an invasion of privacy even if appellants' unsup-
ported assertion that this amounts to the sale of 'personality
profiles' is taken as true because these profiles are only used to de-
termine what type of advertisement is to be sent."' 43 The court,
therefore, implies that the direct marketer's unauthorized used of
personal data is permissible.
State courts, therefore, provide no help to the individual dam-
aged by unscrupulous or careless data merchants. The actual dam-
age caused to individuals by privacy violations is hard to show in a
courtroom. To argue, as in Shibley, that "personality profiles" are
being appropriated without compensation to the individual sounds
a bit far-fetched. After all, no physical or economic damage is evi-
dent. Most people are not even aware that their personal informa-
tion is being regularly packaged and sold for a profit. Although the
common law provides the theoretical support, at least in the tort
and contract realms, for finding informational privacy rights, courts
can not usurp the legislature's responsibility to write the law neces-
sary to protect informational privacy.
D. Public Policy Basis for Protecting Informational Privacy
Perhaps the most obvious and impressive basis for protecting
personal data is the direct impact which lack of protection has on
people. In the Subcommittee' 44 hearing 145 regarding the DPB
bill, 146 a number of industry practices which impact on individuals
were exposed.147 These practices make clear that our current poli-
142. See id. at 339-40.
143. Id. at 339-40.
144. Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture of the House
Committee on Government Operations.
145. The hearing was held on May 16, 1990.
146. Hearing Record, supra note 1.
147. Representative Wise notes that it costs more to have an unlisted phone number,
thereby causing the consumer to pay for privacy. Id. at 161.
Jerry Saltzgaber, Chief Executive Officer of Citicorp's Point-of-Sale (POS) Information
Services described a far-reaching consumer database. "Citicorp POS maintains control of all
names and addresses of our customers." Id. at 89.
David Czernik, Executive Director of the Louisiana Consumers League, described em-
ployers' information services which provide data about individuals' work and credit histories
to prospective employers. By collecting and selling this information, companies are able to
blacklist workers. Even if individuals are aware that these database records exist, it is very
difficult for them to access their own records, much less correct errors. Id. at 139-160.
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cies, which do not broadly regulate private use of personal data,
place profit ahead of personal self-determination and commercial
freedom before personal privacy rights.
For example, Caller I.D., a service made available through
communications technology, has recently been introduced in New
York State despite its negative impact on consumers.1 48 The service
is already available in 22 states and enables subscribers "to identify
and record the telephone number of an incoming call, and therefore
presumably to determine the callers' identity." '149 Advocates claim
the service can be used to deter annoying calls by, for example, ob-
scene callers. 150 But the more likely users of the service are busi-
nesses which will collect telephone numbers for commercial
purposes, such as the preparation of mailing lists.'
There is no legislation to protect the consumer from the on-
slaught of this technology. Certainly, Feist 52 made clear that a tel-
ephone number itself, especially when publicly available in a
telephone directory, is not protected. But when a woman calls an
abortion clinic, and that fact is captured through a Caller I.D. ser-
vice, her privacy has been violated. There should be a law protect-
ing her informational privacy in such a case.
Although the legal establishment is just beginning to recognize
the doctrinal changes that must occur to adapt to new technologies,
such awareness is in its earliest stage. Perhaps, though, we can note
that there is recognition for the importance of information protec-
tion for the economic health of the United States. Intellectual prop-
erty exports, for example, "are one of the few areas where the
United States enjoys a positive balance of trade."' 53 In this age
when information is a primary asset, when the effective manage-
ment of information is widely recognized as the linchpin to indus-
trial success,' 5 4 there need to be safeguards to protect the rights of
the developers and the possessors of information.
148. Anthony Ramirez, New York State Approves Caller-Identification Service, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1992, at Dl.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 111 S.Ct. 1282 (1991). See supra note 122 and accompanying text for a discussion
of this case.
153. Samuelson, supra note 129, at 397.
154. Charles E. Cantu, Privacy, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 313, 315-16 (1988) (stating
that "the dissemination of information [has become] big business").
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III. WHY THERE IS A NEED FOR BROAD LEGISLATION
PROTECTING INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
A. To Protect Individuals
It is important to recognize that the interests in need of protec-
tion relative to the EC's proposed Directives are not merely those of
consumers, but also those of American businesses and the U.S. na-
tional economy. These interests are interdependent. Although leg-
islation which specifically protects personal data in the private
sector may appear to favor consumer interests, it would effectively
protect business and national interests as well.
At this point, however, developing technologies appear to be
rapidly reducing the power of the individual relative to large organi-
zations. The ability of credit card companies, for example, to iden-
tify a cardholder's whereabouts at specific times as on-line card
verification occurs 155 clearly demonstrates that the surveillance and
intrusive abilities of the private sector are beyond the self-protective
abilities of most consumers. The failure of Congress to establish
enforceable rights for personal data protection subjects the most in-
timate aspects of our personal lives to commercial sale. We need to
strike the "delicate balance," as described by the Privacy Protection
Study Commission"5 6 in 1977, between industry's right to access
and trade in information and the individual's right to maintain con-
fidentiality in and control over her personal records. 157
Despite agreement that there is a "need" for this legislation,
Congress has been reluctant to broadly protect 15 8 privacy rights in
this regard. As noted in the Senate Report on the bill preceding the
Privacy Act of 1974: 59
[T]he Committee 160 was persuaded to delay a decision on total
application [of privacy protection legislation to the private sec-
155. See John Markoff, American Express Goes High.Tech, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1988,
§ 3, at 1, 6.
156. The Commission was created by the Privacy Act of 1974. Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5,
88 Stat. 1896, 1905 (1974). The Commission ceased to exist on September 30, 1977. Pub. L.
No. 95-38, 91 Stat. 179 (1977).
157. See THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT ON PERSONAL PRI-
VACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 5-6 (1977).
158. As noted earlier, narrow legislation to protect personal data in the private sector
has been enacted. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. For example, The Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988 § 2(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988), protects videotape rental
data.
159. S. REP. No. 1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916
[hereinafter Privacy Act Legislative History].
160. The Government Operations Committee, authors of the Senate Report on S. 3418
which was passed as P.L. 93-579, the Privacy Act of 1974.
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tor] by considerations of time and investigative resources for de-
veloping a full hearing record and for drafting the needed
complex legislative solution for information abuses in the private
sector .... 161
.T. [T]he decision to authorize.. . a study [on the data
banks, automated data processing programs, and information
systems of the private sector as well as of regional and other gov-
ernmental agencies] is based on the Committee deferral at this
time of legislation for abuses of privacy, due process, and confi-
dentiality in the private sector, a need particularly urgent with
the growth of national data banks, application of computer tech-
nology, and use of new information management practices.
1 62
Acting on the advice of industry lobbyists, Congress has
avoided imposing regulations on businesses that will protect the
consumer, in favor of protecting business.
The Committee has been advised by representatives of the
Direct Mail Marketing Association and by numerous prominent
direct mailers that this practice [of allowing consumers to re-
quest list merchants remove their names from mailing lists] cre-
ates more profitable lists by allowing for the removal of names of
individuals who are unlikely to purchase goods or services from
the soliciting organization.
The purpose of this provision is to extend this practice to all
organizations and to expand the protection to all individuals. It is
consistent with the best practice in American industry and with
the programs and standards of the Association representing
those companies with direct interest in this problem.
The Committee believes such a requirement is a simple and
fair one which will not necessitate a revision of private business
procedures.'63
Where lists are maintained by private companies, the Committee
believes that the decision as to who should be allowed to rent or
buy them is a decision best left up to each individual business-' 64
Although the Senate Report suggests an intention to protect
individuals, lack of regulation actually frees businesses to manipu-
late personal data at will. This practice can be dangerous for the
individual, as also acknowledged in the Senate report:
Mailing lists constitute such personal information when, for ex-
161. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6934 (emphasis supplied).
162. Id. at 6954 (emphasis supplied).
163. Id. at 6947 (emphasis supplied).
164. Id..
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ample, they represent a group of individuals possessing a certain
set of characteristics. The disclosure of this personal information
can be damaging to the individual.1 6 1
If it is true, as the Committee believed, "that the decision... is
best left up to each individual business," 166 it is counterintuitive to
regulate particular businesses as privacy threats arise, which is ex-
actly what Congress has done by regulating the videotape retail-
ing," cable television16 8 and credit reporting industries. 1
69
This piece-meal approach to personal data protection makes it
impossible for an individual to know her privacy rights. In the
present legislative scheme, the individual cannot be assured that a
given industry is required by law to protect the data she provides.
If, for example, one orders videotapes from a mail-order service,
one's records would be protected from disclosure.'70 But there is
no legislative protection for information provided for the mail-order
purchase of lingerie. Such data is exposed to unrestricted
exploitation.
The current lack of a single standard of protection not only
prevents the individual from effectively protecting herself, but pre-
vents effective monitoring by a Data Protection Board. Enforcing
the current legal scheme would require a DPB to oversee only those
select industries (e.g., videotape retailing and credit reporting) that
are regulated. The majority of businesses remain free to trade in
personal data and free of the proposed DPB's oversight.
In 1974, Congress passed comprehensive legislation to protect
personal data stored by federal agencies, thereby setting a precedent
for a comprehensive private sector law. The central concern of the
Privacy Act of 1974171 "was that information obtained for one pur-
pose may not be used for a different purpose without the individ-
ual's consent."' 17
2
Ironically, though, "the Act allowed disclosure of records for
165. Id. at 6946 (emphasis supplied).
166. Id. at 6947.
167. Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 § 2(a)(2), 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
168. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 §§ 601-39, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-611 (1988).
169. The Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act §§ 601-22, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).
171. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1988).
172. S. REP. No. 599, 100th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4342-1,
4342-2 [hereinafter Video Privacy Protection Act Legislative History]. The Privacy Act "es-
tablishes certain minimum information-gathering standards for all agencies to protect the
privacy and due process rights of the individual and to assure that surrender of personal
information is made with informed consent.... Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note
160, at 6917 (emphasis supplied); see also supra note 6.
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'routine uses' 17 3 compatible with the purposes for which the records
were collected."174 Subsequent broad interpretations of this clause
have undercut the very privacy protections embodied in the Act. 175
The legislative and subsequent history of the Privacy Act of
1974 also make it clear that an enforcement mechanism must be
included with the protective measures in order to adequately pro-
tect personal data. Although the Senate Report on the Privacy Act
of 1974 indicated that a Privacy Protection Commission would be
created to enforce the Act,176 by the time of its passage, the com-
promised bill did not provide for a Commission. As a result, the
Privacy Act,
in comparison to data protection legislation in other countries
... is relatively meaningless .... The reason is there is nobody
in charge of the Privacy Act. There is a small group of people in
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at OMB who
are supposed to do something to make the Privacy Act meaning-
ful .... [T]hey can't even generate annual reports on implemen-
tation of the Privacy Act, never mind go about auditing or
encouraging compliance or receiving complaints from
individuals. 177
At the 1983 Subcommittee hearings on the Privacy Act of
1974, the testimony by nongovernment witnesses was highly critical
of the implementation of the Privacy Act by federal agencies.17 1
Ronald Plesser, former general counsel to the Privacy Protection
Study Commission, 179 noted that the Act " 'is overly complex, over
bureaucratic, and contains really no effective enforcement mecha-
nism. It has become almost totally unavailable to most citizens be-
cause of the cumbersome and frustrating nature of its enforcement
remedies.' ,,lO
Although the Privacy Act of 1974 does provide for civil reme-
dies whenever any government agency fails to comply with the
173. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3).
174. Video Privacy Protection Act Legislative History, supra note 173, at 4342-2.
175. Id.
176. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6918.
177. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 79 (testimony of David H. Flaherty, Professor of
History and Law, University of Western Ontario, author of PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SUR-
VEILLANCE SocIETIES (1989)).
178. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 24.
179. The Study Commission was created by the Privacy Act of 1974 to make a "study of
the data banks, automated data processing programs, and information systems of governmen-
tal, regional, and private organizations, in order to determine the standards and procedures in
force for the protection of personal information .. " Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1896,
1906 (1974).
180. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 24.
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Act,18 1 without a body like the Privacy Protection Commission or
Data Protection Board charged with enforcing the regulations and
without agency management prioritizing the issue, federal agencies
express little concern for the privacy interests of those who need
protection. As Professor Flaherty described:
The busy individuals in administrative agencies are already over-
worked. Moreover, those persons working on welfare issues, for
example, remain more concerned about achieving surveillance of
target populations than protecting anyone's privacy. Although
there are coordinators for the Privacy Act in each federal agency,
their role has been very limited.18 2
As Representative Wise has proposed the DPB, it will not be
authorized to investigate private sector violations, nor may it regu-
late the private sector. Rather, the DPB may:
investigate compliance with [the Privacy Act of 1974], and re-
port on any violation of any provision thereof.., to an agency,
the President, the Attorney General, and the Congress.183
The problem with this enforcement provision is that the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974 applies only to personal data within the control of
federal agencies. It does not apply to private companies which store
personal information.
Furthermore, Rep. Wise intends the DPB to be "a resource, a
consultant, a watchdog, and a facilitator... [, but not a] regula-
tor." 8 4 His reasoning stems from concern over heavily bureau-
cratic European registration requirements for databases containing
personal data.1 8 5 For example, the European Commission's pro-
posed Directive to protect personal data'8 6 requires Member States
to provide for a public register of public sector files' 87 and private
sector files'8 8 where the personal data are likely to be circulated
between the Member States. In the early years of the British Data
Protection Act of 1984, "the data protection registrar had 292 bags
of unopened mail which were simply registrations.., they happen
to have 100 staff to open the mail bags."'8 9
However, fears of an unwieldy database registration scheme in
181. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g) (1988).
182. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 23-24.
183. H.R. 685, 102d Cong., Ist Sess., § 2(c)(2)(B) (1991).
184. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H756.
185. Id.
186. Draft Directive, supra note 41.
187. Id. at 6.
188. Id. at 7.
189. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 8.
458 [Vol. 9
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY
the U.S. are unfounded. The draft Directive will not require the
U.S. to register databases. Consistent with the purpose behind the
Privacy Act of 1974,190 draft Directive principles require that data
not be processed without the consent of the individual, except in
specific circumstances.1 91 Although Member States will be required
to provide for database registration, "third countries"19 like the
U.S. will not be held to such rigid standards. Rather, a third coun-
try will be required to "ensure an adequate level of protection," de-
monstrable by "the international commitments it has entered into
or... its domestic law." 193  Such a domestic law would likely be
acceptable if it is consistent with the principle of acquiring the indi-
vidual's consent to process personal data.
At present, though, the U.S. has no private sector analog to the
Privacy Act of 1974. Without a comprehensive private sector pri-
vacy law to enforce, or the ability to regulate the private sector, the
DPB's ability to "serve the interests of consumers, of government,
and of business"' 194 will be extremely limited. In addition, the ab-
sence of such private sector regulations will not satisfy the reciproc-
ity requirements of the draft EC Directive.
Similarly, courts cannot be expected to enable consumers to
protect themselves without legislation defining the unauthorized
disclosure of personal data as a privacy invasion. Although Con-
gress has recognized that "[t]he disclosure of... personal informa-
tion can be damaging to the individual,"1 95 courts have not reached
similar conclusions. The Ohio Court of Appeals, for example, holds
190. See supra note 173.
191. Draft Directive, supra note 41, at 7. Article 8 provides that:
1. The Member States shall provide in their law that, without the con-
sent of the data subject, the recording in a file and any other processing of
personal data shall be lawful only if it is effected in accordance with this Direc-
tive and if:
(a) the processing is carried out under a contract, or in the context of a quasi-
contractual relationship of trust, with the data subject and is necessary for
its discharge; or
(b) the data come from sources generally accessible to the public and their
processing is intended solely for correspondence purposes; or
(c) the controller of the file is pursuing a legitimate interest, on condition that
the interest of the data subject does not prevail.
Id.
192. The draft Directive distinguishes between Member States (of which there are twelve
in the European Economic Community (EC): Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and
third countries. See Draft Directive, supra note 41, at 6, 10.
193. Id. at 10.
194. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 3.
195. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6946.
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that "[w]hen a magazine publisher sells subscription lists to direct
mail advertisers without the consent of the individual subscribers he
does not violate the subscribers' rights of privacy." '19 6
Furthermore, courts are a forum for compensating perceived
damage. The mailing list business, which comprises only one seg-
ment of industry which uses personal data, "exists largely without
the knowledge of the people who are providing the profit, the people
whose names and personal data keep this wheel turning."' 97 In ad-
dressing individual grievances, courts are not equipped to address
industry-wide violations of privacy rights. Whereas a data protec-
tion agency, specifically focused on investigating privacy abuses, ad-
vising government and private organizations, and enforcing privacy
legislation, can protect the individual without her needing to be
aware of the virtually invisible violation of her privacy rights.
Industry spokespeople argue that broad legislation protecting
personal data is unnecessary because industrial self-regulatory prac-
tices are sufficient to protect consumers." 8 This is simply untrue.
As described by Richard A. Barton, the Direct Marketing Associa-
tion's (DMA) Senior Vice President for Government Affairs, the
Association's "flagship program" is the Mail Preference Service,
which consists of a list of people who have requested that they not
receive direct marketing solicitations (aka junk mail).199 In DMA
parlance, the people on this list have executed their "negative op-
tion."2" But even Congress recognizes that "only some people
know about this service, and the distribution of information
through lists is so widespread that people who do manage to get off
lists through such a service, have no way of controlling what all the
other companies do."201 Furthermore, the very focus of the Associ-
ation, which is to "give the public every opportunity [to] get off
mailing lists,"202 is self-serving. The focus of consumer privacy pro-
tection should be that of the Privacy Act of 1974: "information ob-
tained for one purpose may not be used for a different purpose
without the individual's consent."20 3 Consumers are not merely
196. Shibley v. Time, 341 N.E.2d 337, 338 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).
197. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6947 (statement of Senator
Hatfield).
198. See Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 44.
199. Id.
200. Nicholas di Talamo, Private Secrets; European Community Proposals for Data Pro-
tection, DIRECT MARKETING MAG., Vol. 53, April 1991, at 42, 43.
201. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6947.
202. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 44 (statement of Richard A. Barton, Senior Vice
President, Government Affairs, Direct Marketing Association)
203. Video Privacy Protection Act Legislative History, supra note 173, at 4342-2.
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concerned with removing names from mailing lists, or receiving less
junk mail. The concern is that people should be able to control how
and where their personal information is used.
It should not be the consumer's responsibility to remove her
name from a list, but rather, it should be industry's obligation to ask
the consumer's permission to use her name. The consumer should
not be required to execute a "negative option" to stop unwanted
mailings, or other use of personal data. Rather the business should
be required to acquire a "positive option" from the consumer per-
mitting access to and profit from that individual's name, address,
consumer habits, and an infinite variety of other collectable per-
sonal information. 2" Unless the individual explicitly provided her
name and address for inclusion on a mailing list and her consent for
its sale, disclosure of her information would constitute a breach of
the implicit contract she agreed to when providing the data for its
initial purpose.
Another important function that private sector privacy legisla-
tion would serve, then, is to codify the kind of principles and poli-
cies which need to be observed to protect privacy and ensure that
business standards are clear. An example of these principles and
policies is the "Code of Fair Information Practice." A report done
by the Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal
Data Systems to the U.S. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare recommended the enactment of a Federal Code such as this
for all automated personal data systems.205 The Code involves five
principles:
1. There must be no personal data record-keeping whose very
existence is secret.
2. There must be a way for a person to find out what informa-
tion about him is in a record and how it is being used.
3. There must be a way for a person to prevent information
about himself that was obtained for one purpose from being
used or made available for other purposes without his
consent.
4. There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a
record of identifiable information about himself.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or dissemi-
nating records of identifiable personal data must assure the
reliability of the data for their intended use and must take
precautions to prevent misuses of the data.2 ° 6
204. See di Talamo, supra note 201, at 43.
205. Privacy Act Legislative History, supra note 160, at 6923.
206. Id. at 6924.
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Another industrial self-regulatory practice, one which does
seek to integrate the above principles, is termed the "consensual
database."20 7 As defined by Equifax, "[t]his is a list of people who
have expressed consent to be listed and who also offer information
that will be used to target them for different categories of mail."20
Although Equifax's recently instituted consensual program (called
Buyer's Market) satisfies privacy concerns that data not be used for
purposes other than for which it was provided, it is marketed to
consumers as a for-profit service.2"9 While Equifax is clearly seek-
ing to comply with pro-privacy legislation and address the con-
sumer hostility evidenced by the protests over its Marketplace
venture with Lotus,210 it "will profit handsomely if it can charge a
premium for its mailing list," and benefits further by charging con-
sumers a $15 fee to participate in Buyer's Market.211
Thus Equifax is able to charge consumers for their right to pri-
vacy due to the lack of legislative consumer protections.212 Consen-
sual databases appear to satisfy privacy concerns, but they must be
compulsory across the private sector and must guarantee the right
to privacy principles to protect against damaging business
practices.213
B. To Serve Business Interests
Broad private sector privacy legislation would protect busi-
nesses from financial loss and legal liability by providing guidance
in developing policies and procedures for handling personal data.
The destruction of Equifax's joint production plans (and associated
financial loss) for the Marketplace product 214 is only the most re-
cent example of what can happen when companies are not put on
notice of the privacy standards to which they must conform.
The Marketplace disaster is instructive because it demonstrates
an intensifying climate of hostility toward marketers who violate
207. Mark D. Uehling, Here Comes the Perfect Mailing List, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, Aug.
1991, at 10.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Sullum, supra note 20, at 29.
211. Uehling, supra note 208, at 10.
212. Similarly, Representative Wise notes that it costs more to have an unlisted phone
number, thereby causing the consumer to pay for privacy. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at
161.
213. Congress noted the importance of such "negative options" in statements relative to
the Video Privacy Protection Act. See 134 CONG. REC. H10411 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1988)
(statement of Mr. Moorehead).
214. Sullum, supra note 20, at 29.
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consumer privacy. According to a survey sponsored by Equifax,
seventy-six percent of the public feel that the sale of information
about income, home ownership and credit history to direct-mail
companies is "unacceptable." '15 Rising criticism from Congress,
state attorneys general and from consumer and privacy advocates
has motivated TRW to offer free credit reports as a "salve for con-
sumers' fears." '16 This growing sense of violation by consumers,
also recognized by Representative Wise in his remarks introducing
the DPB bill, 17 suggests a potential for consumer legal action
against companies perceived to be violating privacy rights. Such
liability can be protected against if the private sector moves to pro-
tect consumer data from unauthorized disclosure. Legislation
which compels such protection would thereby also protect busi-
nesses from liability.
Another cost-saving, and liability-avoiding benefit of establish-
ing standard privacy protections is to ensure that businesses can in-
vest with the security and knowledge that they are complying with
legal requirements. A broad privacy law would release the private
sector from carrying the cost of conforming to patch-work legisla-
tion and varying judicial standards of privacy. In the absence of
such a standard, technologies appear to be changing the traditional
legal definitions of trespass, property, and privacy faster than the
government's ability to keep pace. When basic definitional ground
rules shift, this threatens the stability on which sound business deci-
sions are based.
The current rapid evolution of technology makes it inevitable
that new threats to privacy will continue to arise. Therefore, a
broad standard of privacy protection is essential to ensure individ-
ual rights, as well as those of business. Justice Brennan noted that:
[the] [d]evelopment of... computers and other sophisticated in-
struments have accelerated the ability of government to intrude
into areas which a person normally chooses to exclude from pry-
ing eyes and inquisitive minds. Consequently judicial interpreta-
215. Uehling, supra note 208, at 12.
216. Peter Kerr, Big Credit Bureau to Let Consumers see Reports Free, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
15, 1991, Al. The article notes that "critics have charged that [TRW, the Trans Union
Corporation and Equifax Inc.] maintain credit histories riddled with mistakes, sell private
data to companies that send out 'junk mail' and make it easy for practically anyone to pull up
confidential reports." Id.
217. Rep. Wise's Introductory Remarks, supra note 10, at H755. ("Americans are
greatly concerned about threats to their personal privacy resulting from the increased use of
computers to collect, maintain, and manipulate personal information. Seven of ten Ameri-
cans agree that consumers have lost control over how personal information about them is
circulated and used by companies.")
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tions of the reach of the constitutional protection of individual
privacy must keep pace with the perils created by these new
devices. 218
Similarly, legislative clarification of the privacy parameters to
which businesses must adhere will not only protect the consumer,
but also the businesses which will be on notice of the rights which
government will protect.
Marketing industry lobbyists are predictably opposed to the
idea of personal data protection. Critics of the European Commis-
sion's proposed Data Protection Directives claim that if imposed,
the legislation could "leave Europe's electronic sales and marketing
machines crippled by legislative arthritis. '219
But data protection needn't mean governmental registration.2
It is, however, undeniable that data protection would require busi-
nesses to make significant modifications in their information-han-
dling practices.221 The costs for such modifications are difficult to
determine. Although Equifax will spend $10 million to create a
consensual database including roughly a quarter of the 80 million
people in its files,222 costs can also be saved when direct marketers
target their efforts (via consensual databases, for example) directly
to receptive consumers. By polling their listees regularly, marketers
can purge uninterested people from their computers, and save mail
production and postage costs. 223
Therein is the rationale for enforcement by the DPB of private
sector privacy legislation. The degree of behavior change required
to be made by businesses to protect individual liberties and personal
privacy is not likely unless compelled by legislation and administra-
tive oversight. Despite the arguments of industry spokespeople like
Citicorp's Jerry Saltzgaber that it is in marketers' self-interest to
protect consumer privacy,224 companies have an obligation to
stockholders to make money. Protecting privacy is expensive and
that cost deters innovation.
C. To Serve the United States' Interests
U.S. businesses will benefit from U.S. privacy legislation which
218. U.S. v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 451-452 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. Louella Miles, Feeling the Draft; European Community's Data Protection Directive
Data Protection, MARKETING, May 30, 1991, at 16.
220. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
221. See Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 35 (testimony of Professor David H. Flaherty).
222. Uehling, supra note 208, at 10.
223. Id.
224. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 88.
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ensures freedom to do business after 1992 throughout the single Eu-
ropean market. The reciprocal legislation requirements of the EC's
proposed Directive will effectively lock U.S. industries out of busi-
ness opportunities if adequate U.S. legislation is not in place. Par-
ticularly in dealing with international concerns, a data protection
board ought to have jurisdiction over private sector information
practices. Private companies transfer an enormous amount of per-
sonal data across international borders every day.225 The U.S.
economy can ill afford to have that pipeline constricted.
Such U.S. data protection legislation, enacted in tandem with a
provision for a privacy enforcement body, will also protect the in-
terests of U.S. businesses by providing for representation in interna-
tional forums where the international impact of privacy issues are
discussed. Although large U.S. corporations can represent their
own interests abroad, the concerns of smaller companies and indi-
viduals are currently not expressed in international privacy forums.
While other countries have set up independent government agencies
to represent domestic privacy,226 the U.S. has no such governmental
body. The DPB would serve the purpose of fostering all U.S. pri-
vacy interests, including those of all businesses, all citizens and the
U.S. Government.227
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The European Commission's proposed Directive 228 provides,
inter alia, comprehensive provisions for private sector protection of
personal data. The following proposed legislative text is a modifica-
tion of pertinent sections of the Directive. Adoption of legislation
modeled on the Directive's principles would not only protect per-
sonal and business interests, but would also satisfy the Directive's
Article 24 requirement for "adequate" reciprocal legislation.
A. SHORT TITLE
This Act may be cited as the "Private Sector Privacy Act"
(hereinafter the "Act").
225. Taking data relating to air travel as an example, some 27,000 messages are involved
in the passenger reservation process for a single 747 flight. Similarly, American Express
processes authorizations of a quarter million credit card transactions and for over $10 billion
in banking transactions daily. Christopher Millard, Data Protection and Privacy Considera-
tions in Transnational Distribution: A European Perspective, THE COMPUTER LAw ASS'N
BULL., Vol. 6, No. 1, 1991, at 17 n.l.
226. See Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 2.
227. Hearing Record, supra note 1, at 76.
228. Draft Directive, supra note 41.
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B. DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Act:
1. "Individual" means a citizen of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence;
2. "Personal Data" means any information relating to an iden-
tified or identifiable individual;
3. "Data Subject" means the individual(s) described by or re-
lating to personal data;
4. "Personal Data File" (file) means any set of personal data,
whether centralized or geographically dispersed, undergoing
automated processing or which, although not undergoing
processing, are structured and accessible in an organized col-
lection according to specific criteria in such a way as to facil-
itate their use or combination;
5. "Processing" means the following operations, whether or not
performed by automated means: the recording, storage, col-
lection or combination of data, and its alteration, use or
communication, including transmission, dissemination, re-
trieval, blocking and erasure;
6. "Private Sector Personal Data Processor" (PDP) means any
natural or legal person or association, including non-profit
and for-profit companies, corporations, organizations and
entities in so far as they carry on an industrial, commercial,
social, civic, political, philosophical, religious, cultural, trade
union, sporting or leisure activity who engages in processing
of personal data;
7. "Data Protection Board" (DPB) means the independent
public authority proposed in HR 685 and further empow-
ered as follows:
a. The DPB shall monitor the application of the national
measures taken pursuant to this Act and perform all the
functions that are entrusted to it by this Act.
b. The DPB shall have investigative powers and effective
powers of intervention against the creation and exploita-
tion of files which do not conform with this Act. To that
end, it shall have, inter alia the power to gather all the
information necessary for the performance of its supervi-
sory duties.
c. Complaints in connection with the protection of individ-
uals in relation to personal data may be lodged with the
DPB by any individual.
C. NON-DISCLOSURE PRINCIPLES
1. Without the consent of the data subject, the recording in a
file and any other private sector processing of personal data
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shall be lawful only if it is effected in accordance with this
Act and if:
a. the processing is carried out under a contract, or in the
context of a quasi-contractual relationship of trust, with
the data subject and is necessary for its discharge; or
b. the data comes from sources generally accessible to the
public and their processing is intended solely for corre-
spondence purposes.
2. No PDP shall disclose any personal information which
is contained in a file by any means of communication to
any person, or private or public entity, except pursuant
to a written request by, or with the prior written consent
of the data subject, unless disclosure of the file would be.
required for reasons relating to:
a. national security; or
b. public safety.
D. INFORMED CONSENT
1. Any giving of consent by a data subject to the processing of
personal data relating to that data subject within the mean-
ing of this Act shall be valid only if:
a. the data subject is supplied with the following
information:
i. the purposes of the file and the types of data stored;
ii. the type of use and the recipients of the personal
data contained in the file; and
iii. the name and address of the PDP;
b. it is specific and express and specifies the types of data,
forms of processing and potential recipients covered by
it; and
c. it may be withdrawn by the data subject at any time
without retroactive effect.
E. RIGHTS OF DATA SUBJECTS
1. Data subjects shall be granted the following rights:
a. To oppose, and, for legitimate reasons, cause the cessa-
tion of the processing of personal data relating to the
data subjects.
b. To know of the existence of a file and to know its pur-
poses and the identity and place of business of all PDP's
with access to that file.
c. To obtain at reasonable intervals, and without excessive
delay or expense, confirmation of whether personal data
relating to data subjects are stored in a file, and commu-
nication to him of such data in an intelligible form.
d. To obtain correction, or erasure, of such data, or block-
ing of access to particular PDPs of such data.
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e. To bring a civil action against the PDP if the rights guar-
anteed in this Act are infringed. Any individual whose
personal data has been stored in a file and who suffers
damage as a result of processing or of any act incompati-
ble with this Act shall be entitled to compensation from
the PDP.
F. RESPONSIBILITIES OF PDP's
1. Every PDP must assure the reliability of the personal data
held in its files by periodic disclosure to and approval of the
data by the data subjects.
2. Every PDP shall take appropriate technical and organiza-
tional measures to protect personal data stored in a file or
communicated in any way against accidental or unauthor-
ized or unconsented to destruction, or accidental loss and
against unauthorized access, modification or other
processing.
V. CONCLUSION
In certain hands, personal information can prevent an individ-
ual from securing employment or health insurance or from protect-
ing herself from a murderer. Perhaps the greatest danger we face
by failing to protect informational privacy is the unreversable weak-
ening of that privacy. By the time the majority recognizes how far
technology and commercial interests have intruded on the individ-
ual, it may be too late to reclaim her privacy. To prevent such a
threat, there is only one viable choice for government to make.
Congress must regulate the behavior of data collectors, and thereby
prevent discrimination against the subjects of personal data files.
The alternate, dangerous choices for dealing with the personal
data issue are either to maintain the status quo, that is to allow
those with the resources to collect and store data to profit from and
intrude on the privacy of people, or to ban the collection of poten-
tially threatening data altogether. This article has sought to illumi-
nate why regulation of private sector use of personal data is
essential to protect against damage to people, and the national
economy.
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